Key points
- The Netherlands holds outsized control over the global AI race through ASML, the only producer of EUV chip-making machines.
- Advanced AI, quantum computing and defence systems depend on these chips, making the supply chain a strategic chokepoint.
- US efforts to restrict China rely heavily on Dutch export controls, exposing the limits of American technological leverage.
- Shifting alliances and “hedging” by middle powers could quickly fragment the current tech order and reshape global AI power dynamics.
By Associate Professor Umair Ghori
The tipping point into a new world order won’t come from a land grab, excessive tariffs or even a kidnapped president.
It could be as simple as a subtle signal from a small European nation that they might be willing to break ranks on China.
Because it is the Netherlands that holds all the chips, literally, in the global race for AI dominance.
The Netherlands is the home base of ASML, the only company in the world capable of producing extreme ultraviolet lithography (EUV) machines.
Without them, the most advanced computer chips simply cannot be made. No EUV machines means no cutting-edge artificial intelligence, no meaningful progress in quantum computing, and no leap to the next generation of military and industrial technology.
That gives a country of 18 million people extraordinary power over the trajectory of a rivalry between China and the US.
Why advanced chips underpin AI, quantum and defence power
As part of its bid to slow China’s technological rise through sweeping export controls on key manufacturing elements, the US leaned heavily on the Netherlands to impose controls that effectively cut China off from EUV-capable tools.
The impact has been real. China has been forced to squeeze more life out of older deep ultraviolet (DUV) technology and pour money into domestic alternatives that still lag years behind the frontier.
Washington often presents this as proof of a strong, unified front. In reality, it exposes an awkward truth – the US doesn’t actually control the most important lever in this contest.
The Netherlands has paid a high price for its allegiance, losing billions of dollars in sales to China.
Its government has accepted that hit on the assumption that the United States remains a reliable partner and that the broader rules-based order is still functioning.
US leverage exposed in the China containment strategy
As US trade policy has become more erratic, more unilateral and more openly transactional, those assumptions are being strongly tested.
We are already seeing signs that middle powers are starting to hedge; events of recent weeks have offered a glimpse of that recalibration in real time.
In Davos, Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney spoke plainly about a changing global order and the need for middle powers to diversify away from overdependence on the United States.
At the same time, US President Donald Trump was threatening higher tariffs for nations – the Netherlands among them -- pushing back on his plan to annex Greenland by force.
He’s subsequently backed away from those threats, exposing the limits of coercive pressure even among close allies.
The Greenland debacle follows several weeks of chaotic foreign policy decisions, including kidnapping Venezuela’s president and military strikes on Iran.
Canada’s recent deal with Beijing to reduce tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and gain better market access for Canadian agricultural exports sent a clear message.
It signalled that countries are looking for room to manoeuvre.
US leverage exposed in the China containment strategy
That puts the US in a precarious position. If the Netherlands were to soften its export controls, or even signal that its commitment is conditional, the balance of leverage would shift overnight.
China would gain critical breathing space and the US would lose one of the few tools it has that genuinely constrains Beijing’s AI ambitions.
That’s why this is about more than chips.
The post-WWII global order rested on the idea that the United States would anchor alliances through predictability, restraint and shared rules.
If that anchor weakens, the system does not neatly transfer allegiances; it fragments.
From unified system to transactional tech blocs
That world becomes more decentralised, more transactional and less bound by common standards.
Technology supply chains and strategic alignments would be negotiated issue by issue, rather than enforced by a single organising power.
In that world, countries that control critical technologies wield outsized influence.
The lesson for Washington is uncomfortable but simple.
Its most effective leverage over China depends on partners who have their own interests, economic limits and political constraints.
Keeping them onside requires more than pressure; it requires behaving like a safe ally.
In the race to dominate artificial intelligence, the decisive power may rest with a handful of machines built in Europe.
If US allies begin to question the price of holding that line, the balance of power could shift faster than Washington expects.
* Associate Professor Umair Ghori is a specialist in international trade and investment law at Bond University.